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An overwhelming majority of criminal cases in the United States utilize plea bargaining 
(90-95%). A plea bargain is an agreement between a criminal defendant and a 
prosecuting attorney where the defendant agrees to plead guilty, or nolo contendre (no 
contest), to one or more charges to reduce or drop other charges. The decision to accept a 
plea bargain must be made by the defendant, so a defendant’s ability to make or 
communicate competent choices regarding a plea bargain is important. However, 
defendant decision-making in plea bargaining is not sufficiently prevalent in plea 
bargaining or decision-making literature. While factors such as strength of evidence and 
attorney recommendation have been explored in defendant plea bargain decision-making, 
the same cannot be said of several cognitive biases that have been shown to affect 
decision-making in defendants. The current study is exploring the role of two such biases, 
temporal discounting and loss aversion, on defendant decision-making in plea bargaining. 
Participants in the study were presented with a vignette that details a plea-bargaining 
scenario and manipulates either temporal discounting or loss aversion, and were asked 
whether or not they would accept the plea bargain. It was found that more participants 
accepted a plea bargain when the consequence of doing so was distal rather than 
proximal, showing that temporal discounting had an effect, but that loss aversion had no 
effect on plea bargain decision-making. These findings can be used to inform various 
actors within the criminal justice system on how to frame plea offers in order to not be 
manipulative towards defendants. 






1. Overview of Literature Review 
An overwhelming majority of criminal cases in the United States utilize plea 
bargaining (90-95%; United States Sentencing Commission, Devers, 2011). A plea 
bargain, sometimes referred to as a plea agreement or plea deal, is an agreement between 
a criminal defendant and a prosecuting attorney where the defendant agrees 
to plead guilty, or nolo contendere (no contest), to one or more charges to reduce or drop 
other charges. When a defendant is accused of a crime, the prosecuting attorney can make 
a plea offer to the defendant’s attorney, who will then convey this information to the 
defendant. If the defendant agrees to accept the plea bargain, it commonly means that the 
defendant will plead guilty to a less serious charge or to the lesser of several charges in 
return for a reduced sentence. Another outcome may be that the defendant will agree to 
plead guilty to the original charges but for a reduced penalty. The Department of Justice 
defines a plea bargain as pleading guilty in exchange for a “concession by the prosecutor” 
(Department of Justice). Understanding the factors that go into a defendant’s choice to 
plead guilty via plea bargaining is important, as the defendant must make the decision of 
their own volition. The goal of this study is to explore two such factors that may play a 
role in plea bargain decision-making in defendants (Bergman & Berman, 2020). 
Plea bargaining can take place at any point in the criminal justice process. Plea 
deals can be offered right after an individual is arrested and before any formal charges are 
filed by the prosecutor. They can also come about in the middle of a trial, or if a trial 
results in a hung jury (where the jurors are split, and a unanimous decision cannot be 
made) in favor of going through another trial. In a typical plea bargain, the defense 





about whether or not to accept the plea bargain ultimately rests with the defendant, the 
defense counsel almost always offers a recommendation to the defendant (Bergman & 
Berman, 2020).  
1.1 Background of Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining allows both the defendant and the prosecution to avoid a 
potentially lengthy trial and may allow criminal defendants to avoid the risk of conviction 
at trial on a more serious charge. For example, in the U.S. legal system, a criminal 
defendant charged with a felony theft charge, the conviction of which would require 
imprisonment in state prison, may be offered the opportunity to plead guilty to 
a misdemeanor theft charge, which may not carry a custodial sentence. A plea bargain is 
a non-trial procedure, and a defendant waives their right to a trail by deciding to plead 
guilty and accept a plea bargain. Therefore, the defendant is also waiving their right to 
present their defense and have their guilt proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
(Langbein, 1979). There are three main types of plea bargains: change bargain, sentence 
bargain and count bargaining. Change bargaining consists of the defendant agreeing to 
plead guilty to reduced charges (e.g., pleading guilty to aggravated assault instead of 
attempted murder). Sentence bargaining consists of the defendant pleading guilty to a 
lighter or alternative sentence than the one they are being convicted of at the time (i.e., 
pleading guilty for a charge in exchange for a sentence of ‘time served’). Lastly, count 
bargaining consists of the defendant pleading guilty to fewer counts of the same charge.  
Plea bargaining is extremely prevalent in the United States criminal justice 
system, with a large majority of cases utilizing it, but it has a controversial history. While 





system, the use of plea bargains has increased over time. The practice began in the early 
1900’s and became common by the 1920’s; by the late 1900’s, about 90% of cases 
utilized plea bargaining (Brown & Bunnell, 2006). Plea bargaining was viewed as 
unconstitutional during the time of the American Civil War; this was due to the belief 
that plea bargaining allowed too many innocent defendants to plead guilty to crimes they 
did not commit; however, by the late twentieth century, plea bargaining became a 
standard feature of the criminal justice system in the United States. There are arguments 
for and against the use of plea bargaining; supporters of plea-bargaining claim that it 
speeds court proceedings and guarantees a conviction, whereas skeptics believe that it 
prevents justice from being served as defendants are “punished” for exercising their right 
to a trial with a more severe potential punishment. On the prosecution side, advantages 
include flexibility to the prosecutor and a guaranteed conviction. For the defense, plea 
bargaining can provide an immediate release for the defendant, a possibility of a more 
lenient sentence, and avoiding a conviction for an undesirably labeled crime (i.e., sex 
offense). Plea bargaining certainly has its advantages, such as defendants avoiding trial-
related mental and financial costs. 
There are pressures on attorneys to recommend plea bargain offers in order to 
forego a trial. Prosecuting attorneys can save extensive amounts of time, effort, and 
resources if a defendant decides to accept a proposed plea bargain. Similarly, public 
defenders are often overworked and have a large caseload, and having a defendant choose 
to accept a plea bargain can reduce their caseload (Wilson, 2016). Plea bargaining is 
efficient and succinct; if every criminal charge were given a full trial, the criminal justice 





workload (Langbein, 1979). Critics of plea-bargaining claim that offering a defendant, an 
individual that is in a vulnerable state, may be coercive and manipulative (Caldwell, 
2011). On the other hand, critics also insinuate that plea bargaining allows defendants to 
weaken the effectiveness of the legal system and allows them to minimize their 
punishment (Smith, 1986).  
1.2 Decision-Making in Defendants 
Decision-making is a key component of criminal cases. In the realm of courtroom 
related decision-making research, most of the literature points to the decision-making 
processes of other courtroom actors. Extensive research has been done on juror and jury 
decision-making (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Bornstein et. al., 2017). Even specifically 
to plea bargaining, a large portion of decision-making research has focused on attorney 
decision-making, and not defendant decision-making (McAllister & Bregman, 1986; 
Kramer, Wolbransky, Heilbrun, 2007). The final decision to accept a plea bargain and 
effectively plead guilty lies solely on the shoulders of the defendant (McCoy vs. 
Louisiana, 2018), and therefore it is important to explore what factors influence these 
decisions. Further, much of the existing literature on defendant plea bargain decision-
making is focused on how innocent defendants choose to accept or deny plea offers (e.g., 
Gazal-Ayal 2006; Wright 2005; Scott & Stuntz 1992). Little has been explored in terms 
of what factors influence a guilty defendant to accept or deny a plea offer (Lee, Jaynes, & 
Ropp, 2020). Since critics of plea bargaining argue that the system is manipulative 
towards defendants, it is important to explore the situational and factors around how plea 





Defendants must make life-impacting decisions such as the decision to plead 
guilty or confess to a crime (Henderson & Shteynberg, 2019). The United States criminal 
justice system is reliant on pleas, with thousands of defendants pleading guilty every day; 
this includes defendants accepting plea bargains (Redlich & Simmons, 2012). Therefore, 
a defendant’s ability to make or communicate competent choices regarding a plea bargain 
is important. Factors such as the nature of the offense, the probability of a conviction, 
expected penalties, and the strength of evidence must be factored into these decisions, 
and often there is added time pressure on the defendant when these decisions are being 
made (Redlich, Babas, Edkins, & Madon, 2017). Additional factors can influence a 
defendant’s decision to accept a plea bargain, including the desire to expedite the process 
or forgo a trial or the possibility of potentially lessening any punishment or avoiding 
severe punishment at trial. (Cohen & Reaves, 2006). Looking into the factors that affect 
plea bargain decision-making is important because, while both the prosecuting and 
defending attorney play a part in the process, the decision ultimately falls to the 
defendant. 
Several factors have been shown to affect plea-bargaining decision-making in 
defendants. Severity of punishment, for one, has been extensively researched and has 
shown to have a significant effect on whether a defendant chooses to accept a plea 
bargain offer (McAllister & Bregman, 1986; Larry et al., 1978). Likewise, Gregory et al., 
(1978) found that more charges and more years in prison as a consequence increased the 
likelihood of both guilty and innocent defendants’ rates of guilty pleas. Probability of a 
conviction has also been shown to affect mock defendant’s decision making when 





and quality of evidence, including eyewitness testimony, has also been studied to 
determine whether there is any effect on decision-making in both mock defendants and 
real defendants (Rosenfeld & Penrod, 2011). In a study that examined the effect of 
likelihood of conviction, threatened punishment, and assumed role in a mock plea-
bargaining decision scenario, it was found that all three factors significantly effect plea 
bargain decision-making (Bordens, 1984). A defendant’s perception of the fairness of the 
plea offer can also play an important role in their willingness to accept a plea offer. 
Interestingly, Edkins and Dervan (2018) found that communicating collateral 
consequences, such as loss of voting rights or loss of professional licensure, did not affect 
mock defendants’ decisions to plead guilty if accepting a plea offer resulted in no prison 
time.  
A hypothetical defendant, with a completely rational mind and no biases at play, 
would theoretically accept a plea bargain offer when the value of that offer was equal or 
less than the value of the outcome that would be expected from going to trial. However, 
several biases can affect how defendants rationally evaluate the value of outcomes. 
Reinforcement modifies behavior in that more satisfying outcomes, not being 
incarcerated, are repeated and dissatisfying outcomes, being incarcerated, are avoided. 
Overconfidence or elevated optimism can cause defendants to choose to go to trial based 
off a skewed perception of the likelihood of winning a trial. Confirmatory bias explains 
how defendants that are in denial of their situation or under distorted impressions are 
likely to ignore the probability of a conviction if they go to trial, skewing their decision-





A commonly cited theory of defendant plea bargain decision-making is the 
shadow of a trial model initially introduced by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) and 
revised by Bushway and Redlich (2012). This model describes a defendant’s decision to 
accept or reject a plea bargain a tactful choice to opt for a certain more lenient sentence 
rather than a possibly more severe one. The model suggests that defendants plead guilty 
if they are offered a plea bargain that is less than or equal to the probability of being 
convicted at trial multiplied by the outcome of trial – or “the expected value at trial.” 
(Lee et al., 2020). In other words, one would expect a defendant to plead guilty if an 
offered sentence is less than or equal to the expected value of going to trial. The 
prosecutor and defendant both predict the expected outcome of going to trial, and the 
defendant will accept the prosecutor’s bargain if that sentence is lower than what they 
predicted the trial outcome to be. Several studies have supported the shadow of a trial 
model (Bushway & Redlich, 2012; Bushway et al., 2014; Kramer, Wolbransky, & 
Heilbrun, 2007; Smith, 1986; but see Abrams, 2011). However, some argue that the 
model does not fully explain the decision-making processes in defendants (Bibas, 2004). 
Bushway and Redlich (2012) replicated Smith’s (1986) work with the same data set and 
advanced methodology, and found that at the individual level, the estimated probability 
of conviction at trial for those who pled guilty was either uncorrelated with evidentiary 
information or correlated in the opposite direction expected by the shadow model. This 
suggests that other factors may explain some variation in willingness to plea (Lee et al., 
2012). Additionally, Kramer and colleagues (2007) reflected that in order for the shadow 
of a trial theory to be universally applicable, it must be assumed that the defendant is 





Therefore, it is imperative to explore these factors and how they play into the decision-
making processes in defendant decision-making. 
Several cognitive and social factors have been explored in the world of defendant 
decision-making, but less in plea-bargaining decision-making. Redlich and colleagues 
(2013) outlined several different social, cognitive, and developmental influences on 
defendant decision-making in plea bargaining situations.  For example, reinforcement 
modifies behavior so that more satisfying outcomes are repeated, and dissatisfying 
outcomes are avoided; that is, defendants will lean more towards decisions that maximize 
good outcomes, like not going to prison, and minimize bad outcomes, likes fines or 
incarceration. This follows the subjective utility theory model of decision-making; this 
theory states that the goal of decision-making is to seek pleasure or avoid pain (Firchhoff, 
Goitein, & Shapira, 1983). Individuals, including defendants, have a proclivity towards 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This proclivity influences all decision-making 
when it comes to a defendant’s case. Heuristics and fallacies, however, can impact a 
defendant’s ability to rationally weigh out options while maximizing well-being. 
Heuristics and biases, or mental shortcuts that make it easier for individuals to make 
decisions by limiting the cognitive workload required, can increase the chance of an error 
in judgement when deciding. Individuals have limited resources and time to make 
decisions, and heuristics and biases filter seemingly less relevant information out in order 
to more efficiently decide (Bibas, 2004). An example of a heuristic is overconfidence, or 
an elevated level of optimism, in one’s ability to win a trial; this can cause defendants to 
go to trial, regardless of the actual probability of winning. Similarly, confirmatory bias 





under a distorted impression that there is no way they will not win their trial. 
Confirmatory bias differs from overconfidence in that overconfident defendants 
overestimate the probability of them winning a trial, whereas confirmatory bias causes a 
defendant to ignore probability altogether (Redlich et al., 2012). Social influence, 
specifically the influence of a defendant’s attorney, can have a significant effect on 
decision-making in defendants as attorneys are a primary source of influence on 
defendants. For the criminal defendant, the attorney serves as an influential source of 
information, and their advice carries considerable weight. Regardless of whether the 
defendant has committed the crime for which they are being prosecuted, an attorney’s 
recommendation is important when a defendant is deciding whether or not to accept a 
plea bargain offer. Attorneys typically hold a higher educational status and more legal 
knowledge and expertise than their clients. Bordens and Basset (1985) examined the 
factors influencing a defendant's decision to accept a plea bargain in a field study of real 
convicted defendants who had plea bargained their cases and found that influence from 
an attorney was among significant factors that contributed to a defendant’s decision to 
accept a plea-bargain offer. Redlich et al., (2013) stated that there is a call for 
experiments examining cognitive, social, and developmental influences on plea 
negotiations. 
Two particular biases of interest are loss aversion and temporal discounting. 
Temporal discounting explains the tendency to weigh more immediate consequences 
more heavily than future consequences. Loss aversion frames the decision-making 
situation in gains and losses, and those gains and losses determine decisions rather than 





conviction, severity of conviction, and strength of evidence have been extensively 
researched, these two biases have not been explored to that extent. Although there is 
abundant empirical research on plea bargaining and temporal discounting, as well as loss 
aversion, separately, research on the relationships between them is underdeveloped.  
1.2.1 Temporal Discounting 
Temporal discounting can be defined as the tendency for the value of future 
outcomes to be lower for closer outcomes than for further ones (Varghese et al., 2014). 
This draws from the concept of delay discounting, which describes individuals’ tendency 
to prefer immediate rewards to rewards that are more distal (Ainslie, 1975). With both of 
these concepts, the weight of a particular outcome decreases as time increases. Temporal 
discounting takes subjective expected utility, or a personal deduction of whether an 
outcome will increase pleasure and decrease pain, and adds differences in time between 
an event and the outcome (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). Within the realm of forensic 
psychology, temporal discounting can be applied to several situations in which an 
individual must make decisions: engaging in risky behaviors; engaging in some criminal 
acts but not others; and making decisions when it comes to one’s legal case (Varghese et 
al., 2014). This bias can certainly be applied to decision-making when it comes to the 
decision to accept or deny a plea bargain. Temporal discounting has been shown to have 
an impact on defendant decision-making; Madon and colleagues (2012) explored 
temporal discounting in a study that tested whether proximal or distal consequences 
resulted in increased guilty confessions; they found that participants were more likely to 
choose an outcome that limited proximal consequences rather than distal ones. In other 





consequences, regardless of the severity of that consequence (Madon et al., 2012). 
Another study examined the effect of length of sentence on plea bargain acceptance 
decision making; it was found that plea acceptance was more likely when the potential 
trial sentence was shorter (5 years) rather than longer (25 years) in mock defendants 
(Schneider & Zottoli, 2019). Temporal discounting surely plays a role in plea-bargaining 
decisions, as plea bargaining often includes the choice between going to prison, a 
proximal consequence, or serving a sentence a different way such as paying a fine or 
completing community service, a distal consequence. 
1.2.2 Loss aversion 
Loss aversion describes “defendants … gambling on avoiding losses, such as loss 
of freedom.” (Redlich, Bibas, Edkin, & Madon, 2017 pp. 344). In other words, loss 
aversion describes an increased sense of sensitivity towards potential losses when faced 
with a decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The baseline state of a defendant is 
freedom, and any possible loss of freedom is a loss; therefore, a defendant may be less 
likely to take risks, like going to trial, to lessen or avoid a lengthy prison sentence. This is 
often shown in defendants who cannot make bail, or for whom bail was denied, since 
they were made to experience that loss of freedom and can fully understand the nature of 
that loss. A recent study reported that even when the bail amount is set at a relatively low 
level, the majority of defendants cannot afford to post bail (Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 
2016). Those who are detained pending trial may view incarceration as the baseline and 
any possible freedom as a gain (Bibas, 2004). According to loss aversion, defendants will 
be more likely to accept a plea bargain to avoid being incarcerated if they have 





conducted by Kellough and Wortley (2002), who tracked the outcomes of more than 
1,800 criminal cases and found that defendants who had been remanded to custody and 
were detained up until the time of adjudication were 2.5 times more likely to plead guilty 
than those who had been released. Additionally, another study that utilized real 
defendants found that being detained before trial significantly increased the probability of 
a conviction primarily through guilty pleas (Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 2016). Tor and 
colleagues (2010) found that individuals who are faced with a potential loss will be more 
risk-seeking, while individuals who are faced with a potential gain will be more risk-
adverse. To frame this in another way, defendants who are incarcerated and faced with 
the potential gain of leaving jail or prison will be less likely to take any risks that will 
cause them to not receive that gain, while defendants who are not incarcerated and faced 
with a potential loss of freedom will be more likely to take the risk of going to trial and 
potentially getting a prison sentence (Tor et al., 2010). 
It is important to consider that factually innocent and factually guilty defendants 
behave differently. In plea bargaining, innocent defendants have been shown to 
underestimate their likelihood of conviction at trial, and therefore be less willing to 
accept plea offers than guilty defendants (Bordens 1984; Gregory et al., 1978). “This 
comparative lack of innocents’ willingness to plead guilty has been construed as a 
systematic and overly optimistic bias toward the odds of acquittal as well as related to a 
perceived unfairness of being wrongly accused” (Tor et al., 2010 pp. 113).  Even in 
experimental studies that used simulations of plea-bargaining scenarios, mock innocent 
defendants are less likely to plead guilty and accept a plea bargain than mock guilty 






While several variables have been examined in the limited amount of defendant 
plea bargain decision-making research, the two biases of temporal discounting and loss 
aversion have not been explored in depth. Exploring these biases will give a greater 
insight into what influences a defendant to accept or deny a plea offer. Since plea 
bargaining is often thought of to be coercive towards defendants, exploring these biases 
in the lens of plea bargaining will better inform how offers are presented to defendants. 
Determining the individual relationships between these two factors and decision-making 
will add to the limited existing literature on defendant decision-making in plea 
bargaining. 
2. Methods 
The aim of this study is to examine the effects of temporal discounting and loss 
aversion on plea bargaining decision-making. This was broken down into two studies: 
Study 1 examines the effect of temporal discounting, while Study 2 examines the effect 
of loss aversion on plea bargain decision-making. Based on previous literature, it was 
hypothesized that both biases will have a significant effect on plea bargain decision-
making. 
In order to determine this, both studies presented participants with a detailed 
vignette outlining a plea-bargaining scenario. The vignette controlled for factors such as 
prior history of the ‘defendant’, family status, job status, relevant biographical 
information, victim information, strength of evidence, etc. (explained further in the next 





decision-making. Information about the case was included, such as the exact charges held 
against the ‘defendant’ and the proposed plea bargain from the prosecuting attorney. 
Depending on the experimental condition, the vignette varied the type of punishment 
framed in terms of time (temporal discounting) and whether or not bail was denied (loss 
aversion), with an explanation of what bail means, since participants may not have that 
background knowledge. These manipulations of the variables are explained in more detail 
in the next paragraph. The vignette was presented in the second person point of view with 
the pronouns ‘you’, ‘your’, etc. to be engaging for the participant and to encourage them 
to adopt the perspective of the defendant. It has been found that second person pronouns 
have a significant impact on audience engagement in narratives. Readers mentally take 
on the perspective of the actor in a given narrative when the pronoun you is used and take 
on an external perspective when the pronouns he or she are used (Brunye et. al., 2009). 
After reading the vignette, participants answered whether they choose to accept the 
proposed plea bargain offer or not. They also answered a confidence scale item asking 
how confident they are in their decision. Then, based on their answer, they were asked 
follow-up questions about why they chose what they chose to give more information 
about what factors influenced their decision.  
An analysis of the differences in confidence levels between participants who said 
yes to the plea bargain and participants who said no was conducted to examine whether 
there were differences between the groups. Confidence is a belief about the validity of 
our own thoughts, knowledge, or performance (Luttrell, 2013).  Looking at group 
differences in confidence can tell us several things. It can tell us whether there was a 





shown to be significantly positively associated with confidence (Luttrell, 2013). To 
contrast, low levels in confidence in decision making has been found to be associated 
significantly with ambiguity of decisions; in other words, when confidence in decision 
making is low, there is more confusion and uncertainty involved in the decision (Cagno 
& Grieco, 2018). This ambiguity can result from any difficulty that an individual 
experiences when evaluating their capabilities or knowledge and is therefore strongly 
connected with their degree of confidence. Lastly, one study examined decision making 
processes in attorneys asked participants to play the role of a prosecuting attorney 
deciding whether to recommend a plea offer to a defendant or follow through with a trial. 
Those who chose to offer the plea deal felt more confident in their decision (Vortuba & 
Tisdale, 2020). The authors go on to state that “it is possible the public—like the courts—
recognizes plea bargaining as the “necessary evil” needed to promote the efficient 
resolution of this case” (pp. 20). Therefore, it would be interesting to look at the 
defendant’s point of view in this situation to see if their confidence in their decision-
making shows similar patterns to what has been found of attorneys in similar studies. 
However, it is important to note that there is no evidence to support any relationship 
between confidence in one’s decision and accuracy of decision making. In fact, several 
heuristics and biases can influence how an individual rates their confidence in their 
decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), so the results from these analyses should 
be interpreted with reservations. For the purposes of this study, confidence was only used 
to exploratorily observe the differences between participants who accepted the plea 





According to the recommendations from the National Institutes of Health, the 
average American reads at about a 6th grade to 8th grade reading level (Eltorai et al., 
2014). Because of this, the vignette has been carefully written to ensure that the reading 
comprehension level is not too high for participants to read. This was done using one of 
the Flesh-Kincaid readability tests (specifically, the Flesch Reading Ease test). This test 
was originally developed under contract to the US Navy as a way to determine reading 
level of passages, to ensure that the technical manuals they used were able to be 
comprehended (Flesch et al., 1975). Now, the test is used universally, from fields like 
higher education to automobile insurance policy making. This test is scored on a scale of 
0 to 100, where 0 indicates a passage that is extremely difficult to read and 100 indicates 
a passage is very easy to read. The vignette used in the current study scored at a 71.5, 
which indicates that the passage is generally easily understood by the average 7th grader, 
and therefore the average American.   
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk is an open, online marketplace for task creation, worker recruitment, 
compensation, and data collection. Individuals register as either requesters or workers. 
Requesters can create and post their task that can be done at a computer by registered 
workers. Workers can browse available tasks and are paid after the successful completion 
of a task. This source was chosen for data collection in order to gather information from a 
sample that resembles that of the public, as opposed to a university sample. Participant 
samples recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk are significantly more diverse and 
higher in quality than a college student sample, and data obtained from the site are similar 





2011; Behrend et al., 2011). Participants were be filtered to ensure that they were United 
States residents and that no participants could participate more than once, or in both 
studies. Additional exclusionary criteria are explained in further paragraphs. 
The vignettes, questions, and accompanying information were presented to 
participants via online survey (Qualtrics). Participants were asked several questions 
regarding demographics: gender, race, age, education level, employment status, prior 
convictions, and previous plea bargain experience (Appendix A). Participants were 
selected if they are United States citizens or residents, 18 or older, and have at least a 
high school diploma/GED to ensure English language comprehension.  
If participants took less than three minutes to take the survey, their response was 
not included in the analysis. This ensured that participants were giving the appropriate 
amount of attention to the survey and not choosing an arbitrary answer to finish quickly. 
Survey response research suggests that using a cutoff of two seconds for each item in a 
survey will successfully eliminate low effort responses (Huang et al., 2012). This, in 
combination with using a words-to-time reading time estimation tool on the passages that 
the participants will read, resulted in a total time of four minutes. The reading time 
estimation tool uses the average speed that a person reads at, which is 200 words per 
minute, to estimate how long it will take for the average person to read the test inputted 
(Azeez, 2020; Brysbaert, 2019). While the survey in its entirety should take the average 
participant around 7-10 minutes to complete, the cutoff of 3 minutes was used to account 
for “speed readers”. 
Participants were provided with a brief explanation of what plea bargaining is 





same level of baseline plea bargaining knowledge. Following this explanation, 
participants were given a short questionnaire (6 questions about plea bargaining, multiple 
choice) prior to being provided with the vignette (Appendix B). This questionnaire was 
used to determine whether participants have sufficient knowledge of the plea-bargaining 
process. “Sufficient knowledge” is defined as a basic level knowledge of plea bargaining 
that will ensure that the participant’s decision to accept or deny a plea bargain is not 
being muddled by their confusion on the subject. Participants who could not establish this 
baseline knowledge were excluded from the study. In order to be included in the analysis, 
participants had to answer at least 3 out of the 6 questions correct. 
The final criterion that was enacted to determine which participants to exclude 
were their answers to the short answer questions. Some participants provided nonsensical 
letters and/or numbers (i.e., “dfnaijdhfiaosh”) as their answers, showing that they put 
little to no effort into the questions, and likely did not read and answer the plea bargain 
and confidence questions with any more effort. This type of nonsensical response is a 
form of careless responding (Holland & Christian, 2009). The breakdown of how many 
participants were excluded from the study is shown in Appendix E. 
In order to ensure that the vignettes used were only measuring the influence of the 
independent variable (temporal discounting or loss aversion), several variables that would 
influence decision-making or that are known to effect defendant decision-making were 
controlled for or were held constant across the vignettes. For example, if biographical 
information was provided in the vignette, it may have caused gender or racial bias for the 
participant. Therefore, biographical information of the ‘defendant’ was controlled for by 





‘fill in’ this information on their own. Strength of evidence for or against a defendant has 
been shown to have an effect on guilty defendants; the stronger the evidence against a 
defendant, the more likely that defendant is to accept a plea bargain offer (Redlich et al., 
2017). Likewise, probability of conviction also has an effect on decision-making 
(Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 2007). These factors (strength of evidence, 
probability of conviction) were controlled for by omitting any information about 
evidence from the vignette. The social influence of an attorney’s recommendation of 
whether to accept or deny the plea bargain can affect a defendant’s decision-making; 
generally, a defendant is more likely to accept a plea bargain if that is the 
recommendation from their attorney (Redlich et al., 2017). Therefore, attorney 
recommendation information was limited to the attorney not recommending either option 
over the other. Type and severity of punishment has been shown to effect guilty and 
innocent defendants’ decision-making (Gregory et al., 1978; Bordens, 1984); this was 
controlled by keeping constant the consequences throughout all vignettes (incarceration if 
they do not accept the plea bargain, and probation/community service as options for if 
they do). Guilt or innocence of the defendant has an effect on plea bargain decision-
making. A guilty defendant is significantly more willing to accept a plea bargain more 
often than an innocent defendant (Tor et. Al, 2010). Therefore, the guilt or innocence of 
the hypothetical defendant was held constant across all vignettes (guilty).  
2.1 Study One 
The independent variable being manipulated is temporal discounting. Temporal 
discounting is examined by manipulating the charges, and therefore the sentence, in the 





sentence of in-person community service starting immediately (proximal outcome), and 
2) lesser charges resulting in community service, collectively due at the end of the two 
years (distal outcome). Not accepting the plea bargain will result in 1 year in jail. It is 
expected that temporal discounting will cause participants to favor distal outcomes, and 
therefore more participants will accept the plea bargain offering a distal outcome rather 
than a proximal outcome.  
Participants were randomly assigned (by Qualtrics) to one of the two conditions; 
they were presented with a vignette with the temporal discounting variable manipulated 
(Appendix C).  
The dependent variable is binary; participants were asked whether they wish to 
accept the plea bargain or not accept the plea bargain. Additionally, participants were 
asked to answer a confidence scale item rating confidence in decision plea bargain 
(qualitative data from follow up questions will be summarized, not examined statistically; 
Appendix D). 
2.2 Study Two 
The independent variable being manipulated is loss aversion. Loss aversion is 
examined by manipulating whether bail was offered or denied; there are two different 
levels, 1) bail is accepted and the defendant is not currently incarcerated and 2) bail was 
denied and the defendant is contemplating this decision while in jail. Accepting the plea 
bargain will result in one year of probation. It is expected that participants in the second 
condition will accept the plea bargain more than participants in the first condition, as a 





Participants were randomly assigned (by Qualtrics) to one of the two conditions; 
they were presented with a vignette with the loss aversion variable manipulated 
(Appendix C).  
The dependent variable is binary; participants were asked whether they wish to 
accept the plea bargain or not accept the plea bargain. Additionally, participants were 
asked to answer a confidence scale item rating confidence in decision plea bargain 
(qualitative data from follow up questions will be summarized, not examined statistically) 
(Appendix D).  
2.3 Statistical analyses 
A Chi-square Test of Independence, with t-test follow up analyses, was used for 
both studies. Each study used a categorical independent variable and a binary, categorical 
dependent variable (yes, I will accept the plea offer and no, I will not accept the plea 
offer), so a Pearson’s chi-square test of independence analysis was used. A Pearson’s chi-
square test of independence is used to determine whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between expected frequencies and observed frequencies for categorical 
variables. Here, the test is being used to assess whether the observations are independent 
from one another to determine whether one outcome is independently related to the 
experimental condition. Then, a t-test comparing confidence item (How confident are 
you…) scores of the proximal versus distal conditions was conducted as a follow up to 








Temporal discounting has been shown to affect defendant decision making in 
guilty pleas generally. Individuals are more likely to plead guilty if the consequence of 
doing so is distal rather than proximal. It is hypothesized that participants will be more 
likely to accept a plea bargain when the potential outcome is distal, rather than proximal, 
as individuals tend to favor distal outcomes. 
Loss aversion has been exploratorily shown to affect decision making in 
defendants, as defendants who are already incarcerated are more likely to plead guilty as 
opposed to taking the risk of going to trial. Therefore, it is hypothesized that participants 
will be more likely to accept a plea bargain if they are being detained at the time of the 
plea bargain offer. 
3. Results 
The chi-square test of independence test provides information about whether the 
observed frequencies in the data are different from what would be expected if the two 
variables were unrelated. In other words, this test can be used to determine whether there 
is an association between two categorical variables. The null hypothesis for this test is 
that the two variables are unrelated. For study 1, the two variables are temporal 
discounting condition and plea bargain decision. For study 2, the two variables are loss 
aversion condition and plea bargain decision making. It was hypothesized that for each 
study, there would be a significant association between the condition variable and plea 
bargain decision making. For study 1, there was a total of 298 participants included. For 






A comparison of the general demographics between study one and the study two 
showed minimal differences. Study one participants (M = 37.30; SD = 11.81) showed a 
similar mean age to study two’s participants (M = 39.94; SD = 12.13), on average (Table 
6a; Table 7a). Study one’s sample seemed to have had a larger number of participants 
identifying as female compared to study two (χ2 (3) = 5.285, p = .152), but both studies 
samples displayed a higher number of male-identifying participants than female-
identifying participants (Table 6b; Table 7b). There were no statistical differences in 
gender for plea bargain decision making for study one (χ2 (2) = 5.493, p = .064) or for 
study two (χ2 (3) = .232, p = .972). Only one participant between both studies identified 
as non-binary. Study one and study two displayed differences in racial demographics, 
with an overwhelming majority of both samples identifying as Caucasian (Table 6c; 
Table 7c). There were statistical differences in race for plea bargain decision making for 
study one (χ2 (5) = 20.130, p = .001), but not for study two (χ2 (5) = 3.063, p = .690). 
Both samples showed similar numbers regarding the highest level of education of the 
participants, with the majority in both samples having a bachelor’s degree (Table 6d; 
Table 7d). There were no statistical differences in education for plea bargain decision 
making for study one (χ2 (3) = .636, p = .888) or for study two (χ2 (4) = 2.315, p = .678). 
Lastly, both samples showed similar numbers in terms of previous experience with the 
criminal justice system or with plea bargaining, with only about 10%-15% of participants 
having prior experience (Table 6e; Table 7e). There were no statistical differences in 
previous experience with the criminal justice system for plea bargain decision making for 





there were no statistical differences in previous plea bargain experience for plea bargain 
decision making for study one (χ2 (2) = .334, p = .846) or for study two (χ2 (2) = 3.972, p 
= .137). For each condition, the majority of participants chose to accept the plea bargain 
offer rather than reject it; this was expected, as outcomes data shows that the majority of 
defendants who are offered a plea bargain choose to accept it (Tor et. al., 2010). 
Interestingly, regardless of condition, more participants in study one (41 out of 296) 
decided to forego a plea bargain to go to trial than in study two (18 out of 298). We 
would expect that these numbers would not differ, since all information was kept constant 
aside from the manipulated variables and the proportion of participants assigned to each 
condition was randomly assigned. This may have occurred due to the differences in 
demographics; racial demographics in particular was different among the groups for 
study one. This is expanded on further in the discussion section. 
3.2.1 Study 1 Preliminary Analyses  
A larger proportion of participants in the distal consequence condition (27 out of 
149) condition decided to reject the plea bargain and go to trial than the proportion of 
participants in the proximal consequence condition (14 out of 147) condition (Table 1).  
3.2.2 Assumptions 
All assumptions associated with both chi-square tests of independence were met. 
All assumptions associated with independent samples t-tests were tested and there was no 
evidence of assumption violation, with the exception of the normality assumption. Due to 
this, bootstrapping was used to estimate the standard errors for the t-test analyses. 





or simply want confidence intervals that don't rely on this assumption, then you can use 
bootstrapping."  Bootstrapping repeatedly picks samples (with replacement) from the data 
when creating standard errors for the statistical test and confidence intervals. Since there 
was a violation of the assumptions of normality, evidenced by the distributions being 
heavily negatively skewed (Table 3), the standard errors were bootstrapped. Levene’s test 
indicated equal variances for the proximal consequence condition, so the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was likely not violated (F = .206, p = .651). For the distal 
consequence condition, equal variances were not assumed (F = 4.760, p = .031), so the 
equal variances not assumed t statistic was used. An alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical tests. 
3.2.3. Study 1 Primary Analyses  
A chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the two variables. In other words, this test 
was used to investigate whether participants were more likely to accept a plea bargain 
when the consequence of doing so was farther away rather than closer. The chi-square 
results indicate that there is a significant association between temporal discounting and 
plea bargain decision making, χ2 (1) = 4.583, p = .032, Cramer’s V = .124.  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if the confidence 
levels of participants statistically significantly different between participants who chose 
to accept a plea bargain versus participants who chose to go to trial. One test was 
conducted for each condition. Confidence levels did significantly differ between 
participants who chose to accept the plea bargain and participants who chose to go to 





well as in the proximal consequence condition (t(145) = 2.495, p = .014; d = .701). For 
the distal consequence condition, participants who decided to offer take the plea bargain 
were more confident in their decision (M = 82.61%, SD = 18.77%) than those who 
decided to go to trial (M = 68.00%, SD = 26.00%). For the proximal consequence 
condition, participants who decided to take the plea bargain were more confident in their 
decision (M = 82.34%, SD = 18.31%) than those who decided to go to trial (M = 69.36%, 
SD = 20.47%). 
3.3.1 Study 2 Preliminary Analyses 
A similar proportion of participants in the currently in jail (9 out of 145) 
condition decided to reject the plea bargain and go to trial compared to the proportion of 
participants in the out on bail (9 out of 153) condition (Table 1).  
3.3.2 Assumptions 
All assumptions associated with both chi-square tests of independence were met. 
All assumptions associated with independent samples t-tests were tested and there was no 
evidence of assumption violation, with the exception of the normality assumption. Due to 
this, bootstrapping was used to estimate the standard errors for the t-test analyses. As 
with study one, bootstrapping was used. Bootstrapping repeatedly picks samples (with 
replacement) from the data when creating standard errors for the statistical test and 
confidence intervals. Since there was a violation of the assumptions of normality, 
evidenced by the distributions being heavily negatively skewed (Table 3), the standard 
errors were bootstrapped. Levene’s test indicated equal variances for the out on bail 





1.946, p = .165). For the currently in jail condition, equal variances were not assumed (F 
= 4.980, p = .027), so the equal variances not assumed t statistic was used. An alpha level 
of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
3.3.3 Study 2 Primary Analyses  
A chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the two variables. In other words, this test 
was used to investigate whether participants were more likely to accept a plea bargain 
when they had already “experienced” a loss of freedom, as opposed to not having 
“experienced” that loss. The chi-square results indicate that there is not a significant 
association between loss aversion and plea bargain decision making, χ2 (1) = .014, p = 
.906, Cramer’s V = .007.  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if the confidence 
levels of participants statistically significantly differed between participants who chose to 
accept a plea bargain versus participants who chose to go to trial. One test was conducted 
for each condition. Confidence levels did significantly differ between participants who 
chose to accept and participants who chose to go to trial, for both the currently in jail 
condition (t(8.44) = 2.448, p = .039; d = 1.34) as well as the out on bail condition (t(151) 
= 2.615, p = .010; d = .899). For the currently in jail condition, participants who decided 
to offer take the plea bargain were more confident in their decision (M = 80.68%, SD = 
18.92%) than those who decided to go to trial (M = 56.33%, SD = 29.44%). For the out 
on bail condition, participants who decided to offer take the plea bargain were more 
confident in their decision (M = 82.11%, SD = 19.61%) than those who decided to go to 





3.4. Qualitative Data 
 Three open-answer questions were asked of each participant after the vignette and 
post-vignette questions were asked. These questions were qualitatively analyzed by 
coding common themes.  
 The first question asked participants what factors went into their decision to either 
accept or reject the plea bargain offer. A large frequency of participants who chose to 
accept the plea bargain offer stated that they did so to avoid jail time, or because 
community service was more attractive of an outcome than possible jail time. A notable 
number of participants stated that they chose to accept the plea bargain offer because they 
did not think they would win if they went to trial, and a smaller number of participants 
stated that they did not want to go through the time and hassle of having a trial. Another 
common theme among participants who chose to accept the plea bargain was that they 
knew they were guilty, so they did not think that they should have a chance to prove their 
innocence at trial. Participants who chose not to accept the plea bargain offer and go to 
trial frequently reported that they did so because they did not think they were guilty, they 
did not think the courts had enough evidence to find them guilty, or they thought that the 
other driver was the one at fault. 
 Question two asked participants if they considered the consequences of pleading 
guilty on their future. Participants who chose to accept the plea bargain reported that they 
mostly thought about the effects of a guilty charge on their career, social life, and family. 
A notable number of participants reported that they weighed the repercussions of a guilty 
charge if they went to trial and thought it would be better to have a guilty charge via plea 





they would figuratively lose a year of their lives if they ended up going to jail. A notable 
number of participants also reported that they did not take into consideration the impacts 
of a guilty charge on their record. Participants who chose not to accept the plea bargain 
and go to trial mostly reported that they considered the effect of a charge on their record 
on their future career and work. As with the participants who said yes to the plea bargain, 
several participants noted that they did not take any future repercussions into account. 
 Lastly, the third question asked participants if they could have had one additional 
piece of information to help their decision making, what that would be. Participants who 
chose to accept the plea bargain reported that they would want to know what evidence the 
courts had against them, as well as a recommendation from their attorney. A notable 
number of participants reported that they had all the information they needed or that they 
could not think of anything else they would want to know. Participants who chose not to 
accept the plea bargain and go to trial mostly reported that they would want to know what 
others in similar position have done, as well as if there was any hard evidence or 
eyewitnesses to prove their guilt at trial. 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Hypotheses 
The primary goal of study one was to examine whether there was a significant 
relationship between temporal discounting and plea bargain decision making. Results 
from study one showed a significant association between temporal discounting and plea 
bargain decision making. The moderate effect size showed that this relationship was 





likely to accept a plea bargain offer when the consequence of doing so is distal, or further 
away, rather than proximal, or closer, to when the individual is making the decision.  
These findings correspond with the existing literature around temporal 
discounting and legal decision making. Previous studies exploring temporal discounting 
on defendant decision making found that individuals gave guilty confessions or accepted 
plea bargains more often when it would limit a proximal punishment (Madon et al., 2012; 
Schneider & Zottoli, 2019). In other words, individuals were more likely to plead guilty 
if the consequence of doing so was distal. Since temporal discounting describes a 
tendency to favor distal consequences over proximal ones, one would expect that this 
trend would translate to plea bargaining as well. Therefore, it was expected that 
participants would choose to accept a plea bargain more often when the consequence of 
doing so was further away, rather than closer.  The effect of temporal discounting on plea 
bargain decision making in the current study performed in the expected direction, with 
distal consequences resulting in more plea bargain acceptances than proximal 
consequences.  
These findings are somewhat consistent with the literature around the shadow of a 
trial model. The shadow of a trial model states that defendants rationally weigh outcomes 
to determine which outcome would be more beneficial. However, it was found that 
temporal discounting had an effect on decision making, and this shows that individuals 
may not always have the capacity to rationally outweigh outcomes to determine the most 
beneficial outcome. The outcomes in both conditions were nearly identical, and yet 
participants significantly differed in decision making. The shadow of a trial model infers 





The results from this study can be used to inform researchers examining 
defendant decision making that not only does temporal discounting play a role when the 
length of prison sentence is manipulated, but also when the time between sentencing and 
beginning of punishment is manipulated. This was among the first studies to examine 
temporal discounting concerning the time between sentencing and beginning of 
punishment. This information can also be used to inform attorneys, and other courtroom 
actors, how the framing of plea bargain offers can affect how a defendant will make their 
decision to either accept it or not accept it, even when the severity of punishment is held 
constant.  
The primary goal of study two was to examine whether there was a significant 
relationship between loss aversion and plea bargain decision making. Results from study 
two showed no significant association between loss aversion and plea bargain decision 
making. The minimal effect size of .007 showed that there was little to no practical 
significance in these findings. These results provide no support for the notion that 
individuals are more likely to accept a plea bargain offer when they have experienced a 
loss of freedom prior to making the decision than if they have not experienced a loss of 
freedom. 
Contrary to what was expected based off previous loss aversion literature, the 
findings from the current study do not support a significant relationship between loss 
aversion and legal decision making. While not many studies have explored the role of 
loss aversion on defendant decision making, it was expected that loss aversion would 
play some role, as evidenced by outcomes data collected from real defendants that shows 





ones (Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 2016). Loss aversion in this 
context describes how incarcerated individuals would be less likely to make any 
decisions that would let them remain incarcerated, like going to trial. Therefore, it was 
expected that the results from this study would reflect this description.  
The inconsistency between the observed data from real defendants and this 
survey-based study could be interesting to explore in future studies. This may point to 
some defendants not being able to fully understand the nature of prison or jail (if they 
have not previously experienced this) when contemplating pleading guilty, either via plea 
bargain or in other contexts. It may be that, if these defendants were given more 
information about jail and prison conditions, they may be more or less likely to take any 
risks that would impact their freedom.  
Analyses on confidence in plea bargain decision were done on an exploratory 
basis. It was found that participants who chose to accept the plea bargain deal were 
significantly more confident than participants who chose to go to trial. From this, it could 
be implied that participants who chose to accept the plea bargain offer put more thought 
into their decision than those that did not accept the plea bargain offer. However, more 
research into the relationship between confidence and defendant decision making in plea 
bargaining must be done to make that claim. As stated previously, the evidence around 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy of decision is not strong, and therefore 
these results should not be weighed heavily. Furthermore, it could have been that factors 
other than confidence in one’s decision could have impacted how participants responded 






The results from both studies can be used to inform defendant decision making 
research. The realm of defendant decision making literature is relatively new and is 
growing, and the strength and relationship between known factors that affect a 
defendant’s decision making are still unclear. It may be that loss aversion and temporal 
discounting on their own do not affect decision making as much as they do in relation to 
other known variables, such as strength of evidence and attorney recommendation 
(Redlich, Babas, Edkins, & Madon, 2017; McAllister & Bregman, 1986; Larry et al., 
1978). Since defendants in real life conditions will be faced with several variables, 
examining the interactions between these factors, and determining how they affect one 
another will help to see the big picture in regards to defendant decision making. Much 
more work needs to be done to understand these factors, but the information gathered 
from these studies can be used as a stepping stone to get to that point.  
4.2 Limitations 
When interpreting the results of both studies, there are several limitations that 
should be kept in mind. One such limitation was issues with the effort put into the survey 
by participants. Both studies were completed on an online platform. It is possible that 
individuals who participated in the study were not putting in the sufficient effort to the 
survey due to this format. Participants did receive credit for completing the survey, so 
they had some amount of motivation to provide accurate and quality responses on the 
survey. However, they completed the survey on their own time and in their chosen 
environment, so any amount of distractions could have caused poor effort from the 
participants. This is evidenced by the scores on the plea-bargaining comprehension 





despite the answers being clear in the passage. Participants answering the survey were not 
monitored for effort aside from filtering out participants who took less than 180 seconds 
to take the survey. Therefore, we do not know whether the participants were actually 
reading the vignettes and making well thought-out decisions or filling out the survey at 
random simply to get to the end of the survey to receive compensation.  
Regarding the lack of significant findings in study two, this may have resulted 
from participants not being able put themselves into the situation of the hypothetical 
defendant. Previous loss aversion studies used samples of actual defendants in jail and 
out on bail who were contemplating plea bargain offers, and participants who have never 
experienced this may not have been able to fully immerse themselves into the scenario. 
Therefore, collecting loss aversion data from actual defendant samples may provide a 
more accurate representation of the effect of loss aversion on decision making.  
In terms of the findings regarding confidence levels, there are several limitations. 
Since this study took place in only a few minutes and the participants had much less time 
to decide than they would in real life, a lack of confidence in their answer could have 
resulted from this time pressure. It may have been that, given more time to decide, they 
would have chosen a different path and might have had more confidence in their answer 
since they had more time to decide, and could utilize other people and resources to help 
to inform their decision. Additionally, several other factors could have been at play when 
participants were rating their confidence. For example, participants’ confidence in the 
criminal justice system as a whole, or the plea-bargaining system, could have impacted 
how they answered the questions. Additionally, as shown by some of the qualitative data 





recommendation or a lack of knowledge of evidence against them, effected participants’ 
confidence in their decision. Therefore, the results from the confidence question must be 
interpreted with these factors in mind.  
Lastly, it is important to take into account the demographic differences between 
the samples. Study one showed a significant difference in race between participants who 
accepted the plea bargain offer and participants who rejected the offer. The ratio of 
African Americans who decided to accept the plea bargain offer compared to those who 
rejected it was almost twice as much as with White or Caucasian participants; the ratio of 
Asian participants was almost twice as much as that of African Americans.  This shows 
that participants of color in this sample accepted a plea bargain significantly more often 
than White or Caucasian participants. However, the majority of participants in the sample 
identified as White or Caucasian, and this is not representative of the population one 
would expect to see involved in the criminal justice system (Bonczar, 2003). According 
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, for non-violent crimes white individuals are often 
underrepresented in the criminal justice system, while Hispanic and Black individuals are 
overrepresented (Beck, 2021). It could have been that with a sample that was more 
representative of the population one would see involved in the criminal justice system, 
different results may have been found. Further research into the interplay between race 
and cognitive biases can be conducted to determine whether these biases influence 
different races incongruently. 
4.3 Potential Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
For study one, the results indicate that the framing of punishments have an 





is framed closer in time, rather than farther, the defendant is more likely to accept the 
plea bargain, even when the severity of punishment is the same. This shows that these 
individuals may not be taking into account more important factors, such as how having 
an offense on their record or how likely they are to win at trial, when they are making 
these decisions. These results can be used to help attorneys in how to frame plea bargain 
offers in order to not be manipulative towards defendants; plea deals framed in 
immediate consequences may cause a defendant to reject a beneficial plea deal that they 
may not have otherwise rejected. As stated previously, a completely rational defendant 
would accept a plea deal when the outcome of that plea deal was worth more than the 
outcome of going to trial. It could be that a defendant would reject a plea deal, even when 
the outcome of the plea deal was better than going to trial, if the punishment were framed 
as a proximal punishment. 
It is important to look at these findings since we expected to find an association 
based off previous literature; however, since not a lot of studies have been done in this 
format, more research on this is imperative to better understand how these variables 
interplay with one another. In order to provide a clearer picture of the relationship 
between loss aversion and plea bargain decision making, as well as the relationship 
between temporal discounting and plea bargain decision making, future studies must be 
conducted. 
It is also important to consider that there was no “constant” condition. That is, for 
study one, there was no condition that did not mention the nature of the punishment, so it 
could be said that the mention of jail time or community service is what swayed decision 





the mention of being in jail at all or the mention of the bail system may have influenced 
decision making in some participants, rather than the actual manipulation of loss 
aversion. Future research that utilizes similar methodology may include the notion of a 
“constant” condition that does not include information the nature of jail or punishment at 
all. If there is a difference in decision making, then we would have more evidence to 
support that the variables of interest are the ones that are impacting decision making, 
rather than other factors.  
There was a high ratio of plea bargain acceptances to plea bargain rejections. 
While this was not surprising as the majority of actual plea deals are accepted by 
defendants, the overwhelming majority of acceptances was unexpected. The vignette 
used intended to leave guilt ambiguous so that the participant could see themselves 
potentially winning at trial, and therefore a less extreme ratio was expected. It could have 
been that the community service option was too good for participants to pass up, and 
therefore participants may have accepted the plea bargain due to the nature of the 
punishment rather than due to the manipulated variables. Further studies should take into 
account the nature of the punishment in terms of severity as compared to the nature of a 
jail or prison sentence in order to reduce this high rate of plea bargain acceptances. 
Further investigation into the interplay between loss aversion and plea bargain 
decision making is important to determine how these two variables affect one another. 
Additionally, a more lab based study would help the participants put themselves in the 
scenario, and would help reduce the low effort problems that came about from the online 





about their decision making could also give a more accurate depiction of what factors go 
into accepting or rejecting a plea bargain. 
It is possible that several factors may have impacted participant’s decision to 
either accept or not accept the plea bargain. One such factor may have been the lack of 
information around the attorney recommendation, as evidenced by the common themes 
found in the qualitative short answer questions. Another factor that may come into play is 
the attitudes of the sample that was collected from. Despite using Amazon MTurk, which 
has been shown to display diverse samples, the majority of participants in both studies 
were Caucasian and had at least a bachelor’s degree. This is not representative of the 
population that is usually involved in the criminal justice system (Bonczar, 2003). 
Therefore, the nature of the sample may have resulted in more participants to choose one 
decision or another. For example, Caucasian individuals have been shown to have more 
trust in attorneys than Black individuals, and therefore may have been more inclined to 
accept a plea bargain offer from an attorney (Pierce & Brodsky, 2002). The findings from 
both studies must be interpreted whilst taking into account the differences in populations 
between the samples of the studies and the population one would see in real life 
defendants in terms of racial demographics. 
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, it was found that attorneys are more confident in 
their decision when they offer a plea bargain deal to a defendant. This is similar to what 
was found in the current study where participants were more confident in their decision 
when they choose to go to trial. More research into the confidence of attorneys and 
defendants is imperative in understanding the decision-making processes of these groups. 






The criminal justice system in the United States is described as a system of pleas 
(Lafler v. Cooper, 2012); the primary way that criminal defendants are convicted in the 
United States is via guilty plea, and this trend is projected to continue for the foreseeable 
future. As we work to better understand the several factors that affect how a defendant 
evaluates plea decisions, we can begin to determine which of these factors are truly 
manipulative towards these defendants. This work can serve to reform policies that 















Table 1.  
Preliminary Data for Study 1 





Distal Consequence 14 133 147 
Proximal 
Consequence 
27 122 149 



























Table 2.  
Preliminary Data for Study 2 





Currently in Jail 9 136 145 
Out on Jail 9 144 153 





























Table 3.  
Skewness of Confidence Data for Each Condition 









Loss Aversion: Currently in 
Jail Condition 
-1.361 .201 



























Table 4.  
t-test Results Comparing Accepted vs Not Accepted Plea Bargain for Study 1 






149 79.97 20.79 2.834 32.61 .008 4.12 25.11 
Proximal 
Consequence 





























Table 5.  
t-test Results Comparing Accepted vs Not Accepted Plea Bargain for Study 2 






145 79.17 20.45 2.448 8.44 .039 1.62 47.08 
Out on 
Bail 




























Table 6a.  
Demographics: Age 
 Mean SD 
Study One 37.30 11.81 






























Table 6b.  
Demographics: Gender 
 Study One Study Two 
Male 167 153 
Female 128 84 































 Study One Study Two 
Asian 47 57 
Black or African 
American 
33 30 
Hispanic or Latino 15 26 
Native American or 
Alaskan Native 
1 2 
White or Caucasian 198 178 


























Table 6d.  
Demographics: Highest Level of Education 
 Study One Study Two 




































Table 6e.  
Demographics: Previous Experience 




Yes 43 51 




Yes 30 45 




















Table 7a.  
Plea Bargain Decision by Gender Crosstabulation 
  Male Female Other Total 
Study One Did Not Accept 
Plea Bargain 
30 11 0 41 
 Accepted Plea 
Bargain 
137 117 1 255 
 Total 167 128 1 196 
Study Two Did Not Accept 
Plea Bargain 
11 6 0 17 
 Accepted Plea 
Bargain 
142 78 2 223 

























Table 7b.  

































32 27 14 1 180 1 255 












51 29 24 2 169 2 277 



















Table 7c.  
Plea Bargain Decision by Education Level Crosstabulation 



























0 25 62 127 41 255 











1 25 59 152 41 178 


















Table 7d.  
Plea Bargain Decision by Previous Experience Crosstabulation 


























9 32 4 37 
 Accepted Plea 
Bargain 
34 216 26 227 






1 17 0 18 
 Accepted Plea 
Bargain 
50 223 45 228 

















Demographics Questionnaire  
1. What is your age?  




d. Other  
i. specify 
3. What is your race (choose all that apply)? 
a. Asian 
b. Black or African American 
c. Hispanic or Latino 
d. Native American or Alaskan Native 
e. White or Caucasian 
f. Other 
i. specify 
4. What is your highest level of education? 
a. Some high school or less 
b. High school diploma/GED 
c. Some college 





e. Graduate or professional degree (i.e., Master’s, MD, doctorate) 
5. Do you have any previous experience with the criminal justice system (i.e., 
arrested, charged with a crime)? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
c. Prefer not to answer 
6. Do you have any previous experience with plea bargaining? 
a. Yes 
b. No  







Plea Bargaining Explanation and Comprehension Questions 
Plea Bargaining Explanation: 
The majority of criminal cases are resolved through a plea bargain (sometimes called a 
plea negotiation or plea agreement), and this usually takes place before a case reaches 
trial. If a plea bargain happens, there will be no trial. By accepting a plea bargain, the 
defendant agrees to plead guilty, usually to a lesser charge than one the defendant is 
being accused of, in exchange for a more lenient sentence to have some of the charges be 
dropped. This bargain is proposed by the prosecuting attorney and approved by a judge. 
The defendant is under no obligation to accept a plea bargain, and many factors may go 
into a defendant’s decision to either accept or reject a plea bargain. While the defendant’s 
attorney may give an opinion or advice to the defendant, the decision lies solely on the 
defendant’s shoulders.  
Here is an example of a plea bargain scenario:  
Suppose Dan is arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated 
assault/battery, based on his alleged use of a baseball bat in a bar fight. A plea 
bargain might be reached in Dan's case in one of several ways: 
1. The prosecuting attorney handling the case approaches Dan and his defense 
attorney and offers to allow Dan to plead guilty to a less serious charge, such as 





2. The prosecuting attorney handling the case approaches Dan and his defense 
attorney and offers to allow Dan to plead guilty to one charge or "count" of 
aggravated assault/battery, in exchange for dismissal of the second count.  
3. The government's evidence against Dan is so strong, and the injuries suffered by 
the assault victim so serious, that Dan agrees to plead guilty to the original charge 
of aggravated assault/battery in exchange for a less severe sentence than he would 
likely receive if a jury found him guilty at trial 
Plea Bargaining Comprehension Questions: (correct answers are bolded) 
A plea bargain is BEST described as: 
a. An agreement between a defendant and a prosecuting attorney to 
reduce the defendant's sentence in exchange for the defendant 
pleading guilty 
b. A contract between prosecutors and the defendant to accept the maximum 
sentence 
c. A contract for the defendant to obtain a higher sentence than what 
normally would be expected at trial 
d. All of the answers are correct 
 
2. Who makes the ultimate decision on whether to accept or reject a plea bargain? 
a. the prosecuting attorney 
b. the jury 
c. the defendant 





e. the judge 
 





4. True or false: Regardless of whether a defendant accepts a plea bargain offer, 
there will still be a trial.  
a. True 
b. False  
 
5. True or false: A defendant must accept a plea bargain that is proposed to them by 
a prosecuting attorney. 
a. True 
b. False  
 
6. Which of the following is a possible outcome of a plea bargain? 
a. The defendant is facing two charges, and accepting the plea bargain means 
they plead guilty to one charge in order to drop the other 
b. The defendant agrees to accept a plea bargain to ensure a lesser sentence 





c. The defendant agrees to plead guilty to a lesser charge than the one they 
are currently facing 








Instructions:  You are about to play the role of a criminal defendant who has been 
indicted (formally accused) for texting and driving and reckless driving. It is important 
for you to treat the information and choices you make in this scenario as if they were real, 
considering your options and the potential consequences of your choices very carefully.  
Above all things, it is important that you treat this scenario as if it were real.   
For temporal discounting study: 
You are driving in the left lane of the interstate going 80 MPH in a 70 MPH zone when 
you receive a text message. You go to read the text, but do not notice that the car in the 
lane next to you is merging into your lane. They are not using their turn signal or looking 
in their blind spot, where you are located. You look up from your phone and immediately 
slam your breaks when you see the car. However, you are not quick enough and you 
crash into the rear of the car. The driver and passenger in that car are injured and are 
immediately rushed to the hospital. The driver has minimal injuries, and the passenger 
has several broken bones and a concussion. Upon this incident, you are arrested. You are 
being charged with two criminal charges: reckless driving and texting and driving. If 
convicted of both charges, you could receive a prison sentence of 1 year. This is your first 
offense. The prosecuting attorney is offering a plea bargain: if you plead guilty to the 
lesser charge of texting and driving, you must complete 100 hours of community 
service that is to be completed by the end of 2021. You can begin these hours as soon 





you plead guilty to the lesser charge of texting and driving, you must complete 100 
hours of community service beginning on Monday. You must attend mandated 
community service and report to your supervisor bi-weekly until you complete your 
hours. Your attorney does not offer a recommendation for either option. If you do not 
accept this plea bargain, you will have a chance to prove your innocence during your 
trial. 
Variable of temporal discounting:  
(1) closer consequence: immediately go to mandatory, timed community service 
(2) distal consequence: complete community service hours sometime in the next year  
 
For loss aversion study: 
You are driving in the left lane of the interstate going 80 MPH in a 70 MPH zone when 
you receive a text message. You go to read the text, but do not notice that the car in the 
lane next to you is merging into your lane. They are not using their turn signal or looking 
in their blind spot, where you are located. You look up from your phone and immediately 
slam your breaks when you see the car. However, you are not quick enough and you 
crash into the rear of the car. The driver and passenger in that car are injured and are 
immediately rushed to the hospital. The driver has minimal injuries, and the passenger 
has several broken bones and a concussion. Upon this incident, you are arrested and 
brought to jail. You are not able to make bail and are currently in jail awaiting your 
trial. You do not have access to any jail facilities (i.e., rec room, exercise room) and 





are able to make bail and are now at home awaiting your trial. (Bail is a set amount 
of money that you give to the courts in order to be let out of jail, with the promise to 
appear in court when you are asked. If you appear in court, you are given the money 
back.) You are being charged with two criminal charges: reckless driving and texting and 
driving. If convicted of both charges, you could receive a prison sentence of 1 year. This 
is your first offense. The prosecuting attorney is offering a plea bargain: if you plead 
guilty to the lesser charge of texting and driving, you must complete 100 hours of 
community service that is to be completed by the end of 2021. Your attorney does not 
offer a recommendation for either option. If you do not accept this plea bargain, you will 
have a chance to prove your innocence during your trial. 
Variable of loss aversion: 
(1) ‘you’ will already be in jail at the time of this decision (loss of freedom is already 
being experienced) 







Post Vignette Questionnaire  
1. Will you accept this plea bargain offer? 
• Yes 
• No  
2. How confident are you in this decision on a scale of 0 to 100 percent, where 0 is 
no confidence and 100 is total confidence? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
           
 
Follow-up questions (open answer): 
1. What factors went into your decision to either accept or reject a plea bargain? 
2. Did you weigh in the consequences of pleading guilty on your future (career, 
education, opportunities, socially, etc?) 
3. If you could have had one more additional piece of information, what would you 











N = 848 
Participants who took less than 3 
minutes removed 
n = 178 
Total responses after removal 
N = 670 
Participants who scored below a 4 
out of 6 on the plea bargaining 
comprehension questions 
n = 45 
Total responses after removal 
N = 625 
Total responses after removal 
N = 594 
Participants who showed careless 
responses removed 
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